Background
The …eld of international trade is as old as economics itself. Adam Smith discussed it in
The Wealth of Nations (published in 1776), as did many classical economists. Yet David Ricardo is credited with the development of the …rst theory of foreign trade, based on sectoral comparative advantage. It postulates that the relative productivity of sectors or industries varies across countries, and this variation determines trade ‡ows: a country exports products from sectors in which it is relatively more productive. Despite the fact that Ricardo's analysis in chapter 7 of his Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation (published in 1817) was designed to illustrate why countries gain from trade (as part of his campaign to abolish the Corn Laws), his insights molded scholarly thinking about trade patterns for many years to come. Although Ricardo's notion of comparative advantage dominated the intellectual discourse on trade issues until it was replaced by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, it had proved to be too di¢ cult for empirical analysis. In particular, it was hard to derive from it predictions that could be tested with data. As a result, initial attempts at empirical analysis-such as MacDougall (1951 MacDougall ( , 1952 and Stern (1962) In 1919 Eli Heckscher published his famous paper "The E¤ect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income,"which became available to English-language readers in its full form only in 1991 (see Heckscher 1919 ). On top of providing an elegant and deep verbal analysis of the e¤ects of trade on factor rewards, Heckscher's contribution laid the foundations for the factor proportions theory. In a doctoral dissertation, his former student Bertil Ohlin integrated these insights into a Walrasian equilibrium system (see Ohlin 1924) , and further elaborated the theory in a pathbreaking book Interregional and International Trade (see Ohlin 1933 ). According to this view, countries that have access to the same technologies, and therefore the same sectoral productivity levels, trade with each other as a result of di¤erences in factor endowments: a country exports products that are relatively intensive in inputs with which it is relatively well endowed. Land-rich countries export land-intensive products, capital-rich countries export capital-intensive products, and labor-rich countries export labor-intensive products. Similarly to Ricardo, the Heckscher-Ohlin approach focuses on sectors. Some sectors, such as chemicals, are capital intensive; other sectors, such as agriculture, are land intensive; and still other sectors, such as clothing, are labor intensive.
Following its elaboration by Samuelson (1948) , Jones (1965) and others, this theory dominated the thinking on trade issues for most of the 20th century. Nevertheless, many years passed before empirical studies that carefully built on the theory emerged. Leontief (1953) triggered a controversy that stimulated "tests" of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, while Leamer (2004) provided the …rst comprehensive analysis of sectoral trade ‡ows for a large number of countries, multiple sectors and multiple inputs, using insights from the theory. Yet only in 1987 did Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskos develop proper tests of the theory, using measures of its three essential elements: sectoral trade ‡ows, sectoral factor intensities, and factor endowments. These tests were based on Vanek's (1968) derivation of the theory's implications for the factor content of sectoral trade ‡ows, and the news was not good: the data rejected the theory. More charitable evaluations of Eli Heckscher's and Bertil Ohlin's insights were later provided by Tre ‡er (1995) , while improvements and elaborations of Tre ‡er's approach were further developed by Davis and Weinstein (2001) . As a result, the belief that factor proportions are important in shaping world trade has been restored.
The 1987 empirical challenge to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory was preceded by another empirical challenge that changed trade theory forever. In 1975, Herbert Grubel and Peter Lloyd published a book entitled Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and Measurement of International Trade in Di¤erentiated Products, in which they pointed out that the phenomenon of intraindustry trade is widespread, where intraindustry trade refers to the exchange of products within the same sectors. France, for example, exported chemical products to Germany and imported chemical products from Germany; France also exported clothing to Germany and imported clothing from Germany; and so on across most manufacturing industries. Grubel and Lloyd devised an index to measure the share of intraindustry trade, and reported that in most industrial countries this share exceeded one half. That is, the majority of trade in manufactures was intraindustry, while the dominant theory of the timeHeckscher-Ohlin-was about intersectoral trade ‡ows, e.g., exports of chemical products in exchange for clothing. This …nding has not changed over the years. In 2002 the OECD reported that the average share of intraindustry trade in 1996-2000 was 77.5% in France, 72% in Germany, and 68.5% in the United States. In Australia it was smaller, only 30%, yet large enough to shed doubt on the pure intersectoral view of foreign trade.
Another observation that triggered a rethinking of the intersectoral view of trade was that much of trade took place among countries at similar levels of development, and particularly among the rich countries. Both Ricardo and Heckscher and Ohlin emphasized cross-country di¤erences as drivers of trade ‡ows, while trade appeared to be predominately among countries that di¤ered relatively little from each other. This too has not changed over time.
In 2006 the WTO reported that out of close to 1.5 trillion dollars worth of manufacturing exports from North America in 2005, more than 800 billion were to North America and more than 200 billion were to Europe. At the same time European countries exported more than 4 trillion dollars worth of manufactures, more than 3 trillion dollars of which were to Europe and close to 400 billion to North America.
These observations, together with theoretical developments in the analysis of monopolistic competition, brought about a revolution in trade theory. New models of foreign trade were developed, with the explicit aim of incorporating intraindustry trade and large trade volumes among similar countries. Lancaster (1979, ch. 10) and Krugman (1979) were the …rst to develop such models, in which industries are populated by …rms that produce di¤erentiated products, each …rm has its own variety, and …rms sell their brands in both domestic and foreign markets. Because variety is desirable in every country, specialization in di¤erent brands of the same good leads to intraindustry trade and to trade among countries that are similar to each other. These formal models used building blocks that were informally discussed in Balassa (1967) , who studied the European Common Market and tried to provide a rationale for why much of the adjustment to the integration process took place within rather than across industries. The resulting theory is rich (see Helpman and Krugman 1985) , it found many applications (including in endogenous growth theory; see Grossman and Helpman 1991) , and it has rami…cations that were empirically examined (see Helpman 2011, ch. 4, for a review). All in all it was a big success, yet a new challenge was quick to emerge.
Challenge and Response
Models of international trade under monopolistic competition, in contrast to neoclassical trade models, designated a central role to individual …rms. Firms made decisions to enter an industry, invested in R&D in order to develop new products, acquired subsidiaries in foreign countries, and priced their products as pro…tably as they could. These decisions determined variety choice, trade patterns, trade volumes, shares of intraindustry trade, and the dynamic evolution of industries (see Krugman 1985, and Helpman 1991 ).
Yet despite these tremendous advances, the theory retained a focus on sectoral outcomes.
Within a sector, …rms were treated symmetrically: they had the same technologies (even when they produced di¤erent brands), they employed the same composition of inputs, and they priced their products similarly. As a result, sectoral outcomes were a manifold of …rm-level outcomes, with the exception of some studies of multinational corporations in which domestic …rms coexisted with multinationals in the same industry (e.g., Helpman 1984) .
Led by Jensen (1995, 1999) , the examination of new data sets that became available in the 1990s posed a challenge to the symmetry assumption within sectors, with wide-reaching consequences. In models of monopolistic competition that were developed in the 1980s, the symmetry assumption was used for convenience, because heterogeneity within sectors was not essential for addressing the main questions for which those models were designed. What the new data sets revealed, however, was that the lens of a "representative …rm"was more restrictive than previously appreciated. In particular, it turned out that in a typical industry only a small fraction of …rms export and that these …rms do not constitute a random sample. Exporters are larger and more productive than nonexporters, foreign markets are disproportionately served by large exporters, and exporters pay higher wages. In the Melitz model …rms produce varieties of a di¤erentiated product. Unlike Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1979) , however, a …rm that enters an industry does not know the total factor productivity (TFP) of its technology. Instead, similarly to Hopenhayn (1992) , it knows the distribution from which its productivity draw will be realized. After sinking the entry cost, a …rm learns its productivity level. Since it has to bear a …xed cost of operation, a …rm stays in business only if its operating pro…ts are high enough to cover this …xed cost.
Entry proceeds until expected pro…ts cover the entry cost, so that ex-ante all entrants break even.
In an open economy a …rm can derive pro…ts from domestic and foreign sales, but it faces variable and destination-speci…c …xed costs of exporting. As a result, a …rm exports only if operating pro…ts in a destination market are large enough to cover the …xed cost of exporting. In equilibrium some …rms remain in the industry, serving only the domestic market, while other …rms sell at home and abroad. The model provides a characterization of …rms that sort into each one of these organizational forms: that is, …rms that stay in the industry after sinking the entry cost, and, among those who stay, …rms that export. Since …rms vary by realized TFP only, the result is that the least productive …rms do not stay in business, while the most productive …rms export. Firms with intermediate productivity serve only the domestic market, while exporters serve the domestic market too.
A remarkable property of this analytical framework is that it replicates the pattern of response to trade liberalization observed in the data. That is, a multilateral reduction in trade costs drives some of the least productive …rms out of the industry and leads to a reallocation of market shares from less to more productive …rms (exporters), consistent with the evidence. By weeding out the least productive …rms and raising the weight of highproductivity …rms in the industry, trade liberalization raises the sector's average productivity.
Can these productivity gains be substantial? The answer is that they can be and they 3.5% out of the 4.9% was attained as a result of productivity-enhancing investments by new exporters, i.e., …rms that did not export prior to the free trade agreement but started to export after its implementation. And 1.4% was attained as a result of investments of existing exporters. Bustos (2011) showed analytically that in the Melitz model the incentive to invest in better technologies is largest among the most productive nonexporters, who …nd it pro…table to become exporters in the aftermath of trade liberalization.
The extent to which productivity gains from exit of the least productive …rms and market share reallocations towards more productive …rms shape welfare gains from trade liberalization has been the subject of a recent controversy. Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) have argued that one can disregard these productivity changes. To justify this claim they show that in a class of models-which includes the basic Melitz model with Pareto distributed productivity-the percentage increase in welfare as a result of changes in variable trade costs equals the percentage decline in the share of a country's spending on its own goods raised to a positive power that equals the elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade costs. According to this view, all we need are estimates of the trade elasticity and the percentage decline (rise) in the share of spending on own goods in order to gauge welfare changes, because the same formula applies to economies with or without …rm heterogeneity.
For this reason details of the within-industry reallocations that change productivity are not relevant for welfare analysis. Finally, an extension of the argument to many sectors brings out the need to also assess the response of intersectoral resource allocation to trade liberalization, and whether inputs move into sectors with large or small declines in the share of spending on own goods and sectors with large or small elasticities of substitution.
While the analysis of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare is elegant and useful, their interpretation of the welfare formula is quite misleading. The reason is that the response of the share of spending on own goods to trade liberalization depends on whether the economy is of the Melitz type or whether …rms within the sectors are all alike. This is particularly relevant for attempts to quantify welfare changes by means of calibration, where the choice of parameters has to place alternative economic environments on the same footing. For example, if one calibrates two models-one model with and the other without …rm heterogeneity-to data of a country that is already engaged in foreign trade, then to match the same data the required parameters will di¤er across models. Under these circumstances, comparisons across models are not very instructive. Melitz and Redding (2013a) provide a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of this type of analysis. They show, for example, that if one calibrates these two models-one with …rm heterogeneity and the other without it-to generate the same outcomes in autarky, including the same average productivity within the sector, then the opening of trade always yields higher welfare gains in the environment with …rm heterogeneity, in which average productivity rises with trade, than in the environment with symmetric …rms, in which productivity does not change.
A particularly interesting quantitative analysis that sheds light on these issues is provided both sectors, they show that trade raises productivity in each of them. However, productivity rises relatively more in the sector with comparative advantage; namely, in the sector that uses relatively intensively the input with which the country is well endowed. Under the circumstances trade raises productivity relatively more in the labor-intensive sector in the country that has relatively more workers, and it raises productivity relatively more in the capital-intensive sector in the country that has relatively more capital. Since the former country exports labor-intensive products on net and the latter exports capital-intensive products on net (while both countries export varieties of both types of goods), it follows that productivity rises proportionately more in the export sector. The implication is that factor proportions induce (endogenously) Ricardian-type comparative advantage, leading to a structure of trade that combines Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin forces. 
Unemployment and Inequality
Labor market frictions are widespread. They di¤er across countries as a result of di¤erences in hiring and …ring practices, the e¤ectiveness of labor markets, and government policies such as unemployment insurance. As a result, rates of unemployment vary across countries and in a trading world they are interdependent. In particular, a country's rate of unemployment depends on the labor market frictions of its trade partners in addition to its own labor market frictions. Because such frictions make room for rent-sharing between employers and employees, they also impact wages and inequality of earnings. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) developed a framework in which there is a traditional homogeneous sector and a sector that produces varieties of a di¤erentiated product. The former sector is competitive in the product market, the latter engages in monopolistic competition.
Unemployment
In both sectors there is search and matching in the labor market.
In the general equilibrium of a two-country world, Helpman and Itskhoki show how di¤erences in labor market frictions generate comparative advantage. In particular, the country that has lower labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector relative to the homogeneous sector exports di¤erentiated products on net. A su¢ cient statistic for these frictions is the resulting cost of hiring, which can di¤er across sectors and countries. They also show that both countries gain from trade, independently of the impact of trade on unemployment.
Tracing the impact of trade on unemployment reveals complicated patterns. Trade may, for example, increase or reduce the level of unemployment. And moreover, reductions of variable trade costs can impact unemployment in a nonmonotonic fashion. Particularly important is the …nding that a reduction in one country's labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector raises its welfare but hurts the trade partner. On the other hand, there exist coordinated reductions in labor market frictions in both countries that bene…t both.
Due to multiple distortions, multiple policies are needed to raise welfare substantially or to attain constrained Pareto e¢ ciency. For example, using unemployment insurance as a single policy tool is bene…cial in some circumstances but harmful in others (see Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 2011). And when unemployment insurance is bene…cial, there exists an optimal level that maximizes welfare.
Unemployment insurance may or may not be part of a policy package that achieves constrained Pareto e¢ ciency. To be sure, some intervention in the labor market is needed to secure the Hosios (1990) condition (for the relationship between the elasticities of the match-ing function and the relative bargaining power of workers), which has to be satis…ed in a constrained Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium. Yet this cannot always be achieved with unemployment insurance, because in some circumstances a tax rather than a subsidy to hiring costs is required. Other policies to achieve this e¢ ciency include subsidizing the output of di¤erenti-ated products (to correct for markup pricing) and subsidizing equally (in percentage terms) the …xed costs of operating and exporting. As a rule, optimal policies do not discriminate between exporting and domestic activities.
Inequality
Research concerning the impact of trade on wage inequality was traditionally focused on the relative wages of workers with di¤erent skills or workers employed in di¤erent sectors and occupations. Much of this work resorted to di¤erences in factor intensities across sectors to transmit international prices into factor rewards. As a result, when the college wage premium almost doubled in the United Sates between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, scholars …rst examined whether this development could be explained by globalization, and in particular by the increased participation of less developed countries in world trade (see Helpman 2004 , ch. 6, for a summary of this literature and for references). The tentative answer was that trade can explain a fraction of the increased gap in relative wages, but that most of it was due to skill-biased technical change. This conclusion was strengthened by studies that showed rising relative wages of skilled workers across the board, in developed and less developing countries alike (see also Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007) .
While wage inequality across skill groups has increased to some extent, changes in the return to observed skills-such as education-account for a small fraction of the rise in overall wage inequality. The majority of the rise in wage inequality was due to the rise in Table 3 ).
Evidently, residual wage inequality is large in both these countries, which di¤er greatly from each other in other dimensions. Moreover, in each of them the contribution of worker observable characteristics to wage inequality is smaller than the contribution within sectors of …rm-speci…c components of wage variation (although the latter is signi…cantly smaller in Sweden than in Brazil).
Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) developed a theoretical model in which residual
wage inequality is a¤ected by foreign trade. In their model heterogeneous …rms select into exporting on the basis of total factor productivity. Workers search for jobs and …rms post vacancies. But while workers are ex-ante identical, a worker's match with a job generates a random productivity outcome. This outcome is not observable, yet …rms can invest in screening to identify workers with a productivity level above an endogeneously chosen threshold.
Since screening is costly, involving a …xed cost that rises with the threshold's level, more productive …rms screen to a higher productivity cuto¤ and therefore employ a better composition of workers. As a result, wage bargaining leads to higher wages being paid by more productive …rms. Under the circumstances more productive …rms are larger, employ better workers, pay higher wages, and the most productive among them export, all in line with the evidence.
A major implication of this model is that lowering trade costs raises residual wage inequality when trade costs are high and reduces residual wage inequality when trade costs are low. In other words, the relationship between trade frictions and wage inequality has an inverted-U shape.
Adding heterogeneity to screening costs and …xed export costs, Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding (2013) show how this analytical framework can be used to derive an econometric model that consists of three equations: for employment, wages, and selection into exporting. Assuming a joint log normal distribution of the three sources of …rm heterogeneity yields a likelihood function. Using this likelihood function, they estimate the econometric model on a large matched employer-employee data set from Brazilian manufacturing.
The estimated model generates …rst and second moments of the distribution of employment and wages (where the latter consists of …rm-speci…c components) that closely approximate moments in the data. In addition, the estimated model generates an inverted-U-shaped relationship between trade frictions and wage inequality, as predicted by the theory.
In this framework trade a¤ects residual wage inequality. To gauge how large these e¤ects might be, Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding examine counterfactual scenarios. They …nd, for example, that in 1994 Brazilian wage inequality due to …rm-speci…c componentswhere wage inequality is measured by the standard deviation of log wages-was about 7.6% higher than it would have been in autarky. This is roughly the largest gap in inequality that trade can generate when …xed export costs vary between zero and in…nity.
Multinational Corporations
By refocusing the analysis from sectors to …rms, recent research has also improved our understanding of the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in global supply chains.
These companies are very large and they play dominant roles in production, employment and foreign trade. To illustrate, according to the most recent benchmark survey of the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), in 2009 the combined value added of U.S. parents of multinationals and their majority-owned a¢ liates exceeded 3.5 trillion dollars and they employed close to 40 million workers (see Barefoot and Mataloni 2011) . MNC-associated U.S. exports of goods were 578 billion dollars, close to 55% of total U.S. exports of goods.
Of these exports, 209 billion were intra…rm (i.e., intra-MNC). At the same time, MNCassociated imports were 703 billion dollars, accounting for 45% of U.S. imports, of which 222 billion were intra…rm. In the manufacturing sector, foreign a¢ liates of these companies sold large fractions of output in the host countries, but they also exported some of it to the U.S. and to other countries. In 2009 host-country sales amounted to 55% of total sales, 11% were to the U.S., and 34% were to other foreign countries. Pure horizontal FDI is considered to arise from a tradeo¤ between proximity and concentration. A …rm that serves a foreign market with exports bears export costs, but saves the cost of acquiring a subsidiary abroad. On the other side, a …rm that serves a foreign market with subsidiary sales bears the cost of the subsidiary, but saves on export costs. Hence the proximity-concentration tradeo¤ (see Markusen 1984) . Brainard (1997) provides evidence in support of this tradeo¤.
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) introduced …rm heterogeneity into the proximityconcentration tradeo¤ framework. They show that, in line with the evidence, this model implies that among …rms that stay in an industry the least productive serve only the domestic market, the most productive serve foreign markets via subsidiary sales, and …rms with intermediate productivity levels serve foreign markets with exports. In 1996, the labor productivity of U.S. multinationals was about 15% larger than the labor productivity of exporters, which was in turn about 40% larger than the labor productivity of purely domestic …rms. But this pecking order was also found in other countries: in Japan (see Head The model also predicts that the share of intra…rm trade should be larger in sectors with higher headquarter intensity and larger productivity dispersion. For the former prediction there is evidence from the U.S., using capital intensity, R&D intensity, and specialized equip- 
Concluding Comments
The …eld of international trade has undergone two major revolutions in the last three decades: …rst by integrating product di¤erentiation and monopolistic competition into its mainstream, second by expanding the integrated framework to accommodate …rm heterogeneity. As a result, the focus has shifted from a sectoral view of trade and foreign direct investment to a …rm-based perspective. This has greatly enriched the analytical framework, making it both more suitable for addressing a host of questions that became paramount for understanding globalization and also more suitable for empirical analysis with the newly available rich data sets. We now have better tools for studying the complex web of trade ‡ows and foreign direct investment, including the boundaries of international …rms and global supply chains.
And we have better tools for studying the impact of international trade on unemployment and inequality, two facets of globalization that have raised many concerns.
